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ABSTRACT

This booklet proposes that citizens and governments think imaginatively about national and international security and take action for comprehensive arms reductions. The document is presented in eight chapters. Chapter I reports that global insecurity exists despite continuous arms control negotiations since World War II. Chapter II discusses international military expenditures and the spread of nuclear weapons. Chapter III stresses the need for improvements in international security to counteract increasing danger of war, escalating arms competition, and military pressure for armaments. Chapter IV suggests that citizens in all countries participate in movements for social change. Chapter V identifies characteristics of an ideal international security system. Chapter VI, the bulk of the document, presents a five phase strategy for system change: (1) education of the public; (2) reduction of military expenditures; (3) reduction of level of nuclear weapons; (4) dismanteling of nuclear weapons and further reduction of military budgets; and (5) authorization of a global security organization and prohibition of production and possession of military equipment. Chapter VII details arguments against disarmament and international cooperation. The final chapter summarizes information presented in the booklet. (Author/DB)

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TOWARD A DEPENDABLE PEACE

A PROPOSAL FOR AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY SYSTEM

by
Robert C. Johansen

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Betty Goetz Lall

Saul H. Mendlovitz

Herbert Scoville, Jr.

Louis B. Sohn

SP 011 083

Institute For World Order, Inc., New York

This essay, which represents the views of the author, is one of several perspectives disseminated by the Institute for World Order for the purpose of encouraging citizens and governments to think imaginatively about security and to take action for comprehensive arms reductions.

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1140 Avenue of the Americas
N.Y., N.Y. 10036

Robert C. Johansen earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1968. He has taught and conducted research at Manchester College and Princeton University. Currently, he is Director of the Grenville Clark Project on Disarmament, Security, and Abolition of the War System, a participant in the World Order Models Project, and President of the Institute for World Order.

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R.C.J.

We do not hold the vision of a world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without war—and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping with conflict.

—Adlai E. Stevenson
United Nations, 1961[1]

1. Our Present Insecurity

We can no longer escape an alarming fact of life. The global arms buildup is out of control. At the present time, nobody can regulate it. No one can anticipate the human consequences of new weapons technology rapidly being deployed by the militarily strong and spreading soon thereafter to many other governments.

Most experts agree that if present trends continue they will eventually lead to catastrophe. Despite almost continuous rounds of arms control negotiations since World War II, more deadly weapons exist in the arsenals of more national governments spending greater amounts of money for instruments of more frightening destruction than at any time in history.

Can nothing be done? Are there no alternatives to massive armaments or surrender? Are there no practical steps to be taken toward a more secure, less violent world? The purpose of this essay is to address these questions from the perspective of a planetary citizen, yet with a focus on the United States role in global peacemaking. In doing so, I will make these points:

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1. Adlai E. Stevenson, "Working Toward a World Without War," statement made in Committee I, United Nations, November 15, 1961, reprinted in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Disarmament: The New U.S. Initiative* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 18.

1. Despite the negotiation of several specific arms limitation agreements during the last twenty-five years, arms control has failed and will continue to fail to reverse the arms buildup in general.

2. The nature of the present international political system encourages endless competitive military buildups. Given modern technologies, this system is intolerably wasteful and dangerous.

3. Within several decades a process can be firmly established and even well advanced for transforming the existing war system into a new peace system. The alternative system could provide more security, prosperity, human rights, and environmental protection than the present international system.

4. The prospects for building a popular movement, upon which implementation of an alternative system will depend, are growing. Given a positive vision of the future, a sensible strategy for change, and the willingness of many people to act, the potential for a social movement will increase. Political coalitions will grow among people impressed with the relationship between the militarization of the planet on the one hand and the disregard for human rights, the imbalance of our ecosystem, and the poverty of millions of people on the other.

5. If an appropriate strategy for system change is followed, a broadly based movement can stimulate national governments to create a peace system in which our own and the entire planet's children may live with increased security.

"Arms control" normally is used to refer to international agreements aimed at **stabilizing** *levels of armaments. Such agreements may specify that arms be modestly reduced, increased, or maintained at existing levels.*

"Disarmament" refers to measures aimed at **reducing** *arms to a point where only sufficient arms are retained to enable internal police forces to maintain domestic tranquility. Usually disarmament measures mean large reductions, but they may also refer to small reductions if they are a part of a process leading toward general and complete disarmament.*

These definitions are followed in this essay.

2.

The Failure of Present Policies

The limits of the present approach to reversing the arms build-up are clear. Military expenditures, destructive capability, and the ability to produce nuclear weapons have expanded dangerously over the past three decades of arms control negotiations.

2.1. The Growth of Military Expenditures

Despite prolonged arms control negotiations, the world's governments have spent more than $6 trillion for armaments since World War II.[2] If one person spent $10,000 a day for 365 days of every year, it would take more than 1,600,000 years to spend that amount of money. Since 1948, world military expenditures in real

2. This amount is calculated at 1977 prices. Frank Barnaby, "World Armament and Disarmament," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 32 (June 1976), p. 25.

terms have increased at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent. More than twice as large a portion of the world's total output now goes to military uses as did either before the First World War or during the period between the First and Second World Wars.

Humanity now annually devotes to military purposes an amount of resources that exceeds the world's total output at the beginning of this century. In constant prices military expenditures increased 3000 percent between 1900 and 1976.[3] In 1977 alone, the world's governments spent roughly $350 billion for military purposes. Annual military expenditures equal the total income of the 2 billion people in the poorest half of the world's population.[4] Governments spend approximately as much in preparation to destroy human beings as they spend annually to educate them.[5] Over $25 billion goes into military research or about 40 percent of the entire world expenditures for all research and development.[6]

The pace for these expenditures is set by the United States and Soviet Union which spend two-thirds of all military outlays.[7] The Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations account for about 80 percent of the world total. Yet, the global pattern of spending has been gradually changing.

Third World countries have been increasing their military purchases faster than even the richest of the industrialized countries. All the developing countries together spent about 18 percent of the world total in 1975, compared to 9 percent in 1960.[8] The most extreme case has occurred in the Middle East, where real military expenditures in 1975 were thirteen times higher than in 1960.

The growth of military budgets has generated an increased demand for weapons which in turn has led to expanding capabilities to produce military equipment. At the end of World War II, only five countries were able to build major weapons. Now more than thirty countries can.

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3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments: The Nuclear Threat* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1977), p. 6.

4. Ruth Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1977* (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publications, 1977), pp. 5-6.

5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1976), p. 11.

6. Sivard (fn. 4), p. 6. See also SIPRI (fn. 5), p. 13.

7. Sivard (fn. 4), p. 13.

8. *Ibid.*

FIGURE 1

World military expenditures 1908-76

$ Billions (constant 1973)



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments: The Nuclear Threat* (Stockholm. SIPRI, 1977), p. 6. Reprinted with permission.

In brief, the prevailing approach to arms reductions is failing, as ample evidence demonstrates.

—Total expenditures are enormous.

—They are rising.

—The pattern of spending is shifting toward the militarization of the entire planet, whereas previously only the industrialized states purchased large arsenals.

—Despite the decline in the percentage of the world total that is spent by the industrial powers, even the most heavily armed are not decreasing their spending in absolute terms.

These data mean that a vast amount of natural resources, capital, and brainpower is unavailable to meet pressing human needs. In addition, the military-related people and their financial strength together constitute a formidable political force that resists conversion to non-military purposes. This force increases steadily.

FIGURE 2

World Military Expenditures

$ Billions (constant 1974)



Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1. Reprinted with permission.

2.2. *The Increase in Destructive Capability*

The ability to destroy entire societies has also grown enormously while negotiations for arms control have proceeded. The most intense recent negotiations to control the arms race have been the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United

States and the Soviet Union. During the period of time from the opening of the talks until one year after the Vladivostok Accord (1969-75), the number of deployed strategic launch vehicles increased by one-third. The Vladivostok ceiling for missiles to launch multiple independently targetable, re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) allowed a total of 2,640 for both sides, an increase of 217

TABLE 1

Production of major weapons and components in the Third World, 1950-76

Country	Military aircraft	Guided missiles	Armoured fighting vehicles	Warships	Military electronics	Aero-engines
Argentina	X	X	X	X		X
Brazil	X	X	X	X	X	X
Burma				X		
Chile				X		
China	X	X	X	X	X	X
Colombia				X		
Dominican Republic				X		
Egypt	X	X				X
Gabon				X		
India	X	X	X	X	X	X
Indonesia	X			X		
Iran	X	X				
Israel	X	X	X	X	X	X
Korea, North	X			X		
Korea, South	X			X		
Libya	X					
Mexico	X			X		
Pakistan	X	X	X	X		
Peru	X			X		
Phillippines	X	X	X	X	X	
Rhodesia				X		
Singapore				X		
South Africa	X	X	X	X	X	X
Syria				X		
Taiwan	X	X		X		
Thailand	X			X		
Venezuela				X		
Vietnam, South	X					

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments: The Nuclear Threat* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1977), p.17. Reprinted with permission.

percent over what existed at the time of the "successful" arms control talks at Vladivostok. The ceilings allowed 1,808 new MIRVed vehicles. If one assumes an average of eight extra warheads per missile over the number possible without MIRV's, the destructive potential *added* by the Vladivostok agreement, measured in terms of the number of targets to be destroyed, was nearly *twice the combined United States-Soviet ballistic missile capacity at the time of the meeting.*[9]

During the twelve-month period in which the Vladivostok Accord came roughly at midpoint, the United States increased its arsenal by the equivalent of one complete retaliatory force (950 warheads) capable of inflicting assured destruction on the Soviet Union. The number of independently targetable warheads deployed on missiles by the superpowers in 1977 was *four times greater* than when SALT began.

If projected figures for a SALT II treaty are accepted, they will be a bit lower than the Vladivostok ceilings, but still far above the number of warheads that existed at the time of the discussions in Vladivostok. Despite *detente* and "success" in the SALT treaty of 1972 and the Accord of 1974, immediately after these accomplishments the U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to increase its destructive capability by proceeding with efforts to develop:

—the enormous Trident submarine with 24 missile tubes;
—the long-range Trident missile;
—a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) with pinpoint accuracy;
—additional missile capability, to provide greater yield, accuracy, and throw weight for land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles;
—new techniques for rapid firing from ICBM silos;
—the Command Data Buffer System, permitting the Minuteman III to be retargeted remotely and rapidly;
—the M-X, an entirely new, mobile ICBM;
—the cruise missile, which can maneuver and target itself after being launched from a submarine, ship, aircraft, or mobile land base;
—sophisticated guidance and command technologies, such as the Advanced Ballistic Reentry System (ABRES),

9. The United States possessed 5,966 warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's, whereas the Soviet Union had 2,203. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1974* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1974), p. 107.

which gives warheads increased maneuverability, penetrability, and terminal guidance;

—a totally new reentry vehicle capable of carrying a higher yield warhead;

—a worldwide communication satellite system, called NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, designed to give pinpoint accuracy even to SLBM's.[10]

The Soviet Union has pushed forward with similar research and development in many of the same areas.

Despite the failure of the Vladivostok accord to restrict the arms race in a substantial way, President Gerald Ford said the agreement was a "real breakthrough [that] puts a cap on the arms race." He announced that "we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race which has heretofore eluded us since the nuclear age began.... We have...set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war-breeding tension and economic waste."[11] Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the agreement as a "breakthrough" that, when formally ratified, would "be seen as one of the turning points in the history of the post-World War II arms race."[12]

For those people committed to the arms control approach, the test of "successful negotiations" is not whether meaningful steps have been taken toward the goal of a world without weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they ask whether the size of the expected arms buildup is less than what might have occurred with no negotiations at all. Even if one granted the doubtful proposition that the Vladivostok accord did not actually stimulate new weapons deployments, to view it (or a new SALT agreement similar to it) as a major achievement is at best a serious exaggeration. At worst it is a catastrophic deception, if one seeks to *reverse* present trends.

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10. See Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's advocacy of advanced research in these areas, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. II-10, 11, 20-54; Malcolm Currie, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings*, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 2644, 2694-2709.

11. *New York Times*, December 3, 1974.

12. *New York Times*, November 25, 1974; see also Kissinger's statement in *New York Times*, December 1, 1974.

FIGURE 3

Total U.S. and U.S.S.R. Warheads on Strategic Delivery Vehicles



Source: Robert C. Johansen, "A Global Humanist Critique of National Policies for Arms Control," *The Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 31 (Fall/Winter, 1977), p. 226. Copyright 1978 by the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York. Reprinted with permission.

2.3. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The prevailing approach also has done little to slow the addition of still more advanced weapons to the arsenals of the nuclear-weapons countries (vertical proliferation) or to halt the spread of technology which additional countries may use for acquiring nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation). Five countries have exploded nuclear devices since the first negotiations on nuclear policy began thirty years ago. Even after more than a decade of nuclear testing, the United States and the Soviet Union could agree

to sign a test ban treaty only if it allowed them to test new warheads underground. Such an agreement was achieved in 1963, but countries like China and France, which wanted further atmospheric tests, have refused to sign.

As far as is publicly known, from 1945 until 1977 six governments have exploded a total of 1,081 nuclear devices. More than half of all nuclear tests have occurred since the test ban was signed. The average yearly number of tests during the thirteen years since the treaty is 68 percent *higher* than the average number of tests during the eighteen years of testing before the agreement. Even if a comprehensive test ban, prohibiting all tests, is concluded soon among the United States, Soviet Union, and Britain, this would not prevent other states from conducting tests.

Public opposition to nuclear testing in general *declined* after the *health* hazard of radioactive fallout was substantially removed by the atmospheric test ban. Yet the *military* implications of continued underground testing by signatories, and of continued atmospheric tests by non-signatories, were as serious as before the treaty. The partial test ban, in effect, weakened the public pressure for arms reductions. As an arms control measure, the treaty may have been desireable in itself, but it also discouraged more substantial efforts at reversing the arms buildup.

As long as arms control negotiations fail to stop vertical proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament (and there is little prospect that this will be accomplished by present policies), horizontal proliferation is bound to proceed. The nuclear-weapons powers continue to modernize their weapons and to gain prestige and diplomatic leverage from them. In doing so, they whet the appetites of countries without nuclear weapons technology for acquiring it.

The apprehensive concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries can divert attention away from the alarming growth occurring in the already massive arsenals of the superpowers. Despite the genuine dangers of horizontal proliferation, it is important to understand that there is no reasonable means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries without drastic changes in the policies of the present nuclear-weapons powers themselves. The poor and presently less powerful states will not be inclined to give up access to nuclear weapons permanently as long as the nuclear-weapons countries claim a right to retain such weapons indefinitely.

Furthermore, the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes cannot be uncoupled from its spread for weapons pur-

poses. When a government acquires either a small nuclear reactor for research or a large one for generating electricity, that government advances a step closer to having nuclear explosives.[13] By building a chemical reprocessing unit to remove plutonium, reactor owners can produce atomic bombs. Yet arms control policies have

TABLE 2

Countries with Technical Capability of Detonating a Nuclear Device

Now	Within 1 to 2 years	Within 3 to 6 years	Within 7 to 10 years
China	Canada	Argentina	Bulgaria
France	Fed. Rep. of Germany	Australia	Chile
India	Israel	Austria	Cuba
Soviet Union	Italy	Belgium	Egypt
United Kingdom	Japan	Brazil	Finland
United States	South Africa	Czechoslovakia	Hungary
	Sweden	Denmark	Indonesia
	Switzerland	German Dem. Rep.	Iran
	Taiwan	Netherlands	Libya
		Norway	Mexico
		Pakistan	Portugal
		Poland	Rumania
		South Korea	Turkey
		Spain	Venezuela
			Yugoslavia

not even sought to prevent the spread of nuclear reactors. The international inspection that now exists to detect secret diversion of reactor products to weapons purposes provides no protection against *unilateral* decisions to make weapons or to withdraw from the arrangements for international inspection.

Twenty-one countries have reactors operating now. Twenty more plan to acquire an atomic power industry within the next decade. By 1990, reactors in the less developed countries alone will produce enough plutonium, if it is separated, for approximately 3,000 bombs a year. More than thirty countries could have the capacity to construct nuclear explosives within ten years.

13. Power reactors produce by-products which, when separated from "spent" fuel rods, yield weapons grade fissile materials. William Epstein reports (p. 40) that small plutonium separation plants can be built in one or two years by any country with a modest amount of advanced technology and at the relatively low cost of several million dollars. The problem of nuclear proliferation is discussed at length in his book, *The Last Chance* (New York: The Free Press, 1976). See also Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), Chapter 6.

3.
The Need for System Change

The history of efforts to control arms reveals not only the failure to reduce them, but also the failure of the international political system to provide the security that all societies need and deserve. Present policies and the existing system repeatedly have denied us the opportunity to increase our security and to abolish arms.

3.1. The Increasing Danger of War

Consider how poorly the present security system functions. Although the United States is the most powerful nation on earth, we have no way to protect ourselves against a nuclear attack. Given the continuation of the trends noted above, our security will decline further in the future, even in the face of continuing efforts to maintain a very high level of military preparedness.

Some experts have calculated that the probability of a general nuclear war is increasing.[14] Others have predicted that nuclear

14. Frank Barnaby, "The Mounting Prospects of Nuclear War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 33 (June 1977), p. 11; Frank Barnaby, "The Technological Explosion in Armaments," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 8 (1977), p. 347.

weapons will be used in combat before the end of the century—most likely by medium powers.[15] The danger of nuclear war will increase further as tactical nuclear weapons become lighter and more mobile, because they will be viewed as similar to conventional explosives. Although any single national government may believe that its security is increased if it accumulates more and more advanced weapons, for world society as a whole both the likelihood and the destructiveness of future wars are increased by the steady expansion of military arsenals and military influence around the world.

The frequency of conventional war may also be increasing.[16] More than 100 international and civil wars have been fought from 1945 to 1975. The total duration of this collective violence exceeds 350 war years. The armed forces of 81 different states, composed predominantly of young people, have killed more persons in these wars than died during all of World War II. From 1945 through 1976, not a day passed in which at least one war was not being waged somewhere on our planet.

Radioactive fallout from the use of nuclear weapons by any country will affect persons far from the theater of war itself. In addition to the direct slaughter of millions of people from blast and fire, a general nuclear war will inject substances into the stratosphere which would seriously deplete the ozone density surrounding the entire planet and lead to increases in skin cancer and other maladies caused by ultraviolet radiation. Fred Iklé, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reported that these effects would pose a threat to all life on earth.[17]

15. See the report of the Harvard-Massachusetts Institute of Technology Arms Control Seminar, Paul Doty, Richard Garwin, George Kistiakowsky, George Rathjens, and Thomas Schelling, "Nuclear War by 1999?" *Harvard Magazine*, Vol. 78 (November 1975), pp. 19-25, reprinted in *Current*, January 1976, pp. 32-43.

16. See Barnaby (fn. 2), p. 25. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that 119 civil and international wars have occurred in the first thirty years after World War II.

17. *New York Times*, September 67, 1974. See also Fred Iklé, "Nuclear Disarmament without Secrecy," speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, September 5, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, mimeographed), p. 5.

3.2. *The International System's Inability to Humanize World Society*

The failures of the present security system are as serious for many persons living at peace as for those suffering war. Consuming $350 billion every year, worldwide military programs stimulate inflation, increase unemployment (compared to the number of jobs possible with equal investment in non-military production), raise costs of many consumer goods and public services, deplete scarce resources required for meeting basic human needs, slow economic improvement for the poor, and increase environmental pollution. The military priorities of the present international system leave more than half a billion persons malnourished; half of the world's people without adequate shelter and health care; and half of the world's school-age children without teachers and schools.[18]

3.3. *The Inevitability of Arms Competition*

The very nature of the system of sovereign states encourages armed rivalry between governments. Because the system provides no impartial, dependable way to prevent one government from violently coercing another, governments seek arms as a means of self-help. Regardless of who is in the White House or the Kremlin, and whether the perceived threat is one "ism" or another, arms buildups will continue indefinitely—unless this system is fundamentally changed. As long as arms are allowed to be useful, they will be acquired and used, either to gain advantage in diplomacy or in combat.

The existing war system may have performed certain functions satisfactorily, though at great cost to some, in an earlier age. But given modern technologies, the war system is both unacceptably dangerous and totally unnecessary—unacceptably dangerous because war could be suicidal for much or all of humanity, and totally unnecessary because modern communication, technology, and values could, if properly utilized, support a system that permits only nonviolent means of settling conflicts and of enforcing political decisions. We *could* build that system, but it seems beyond our grasp because of the narrow political perspectives and value commitments within which our societies and their governing officials operate.

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18. Sivard (fn. 4), pp. 5-19.

The war system is the prevailing set of political, economic, and social relationships that are characterized by identification with part of rather than the whole human species and by unreflective loyalties to national political symbols, which together make war, the preparation for war, or the threat of violence a widely condoned and expected means for settling disputes.

In a peace system conflict is resolved through nonviolent, political, social, and judicial processes. There are no expectations of war and no national military arsenals. There is a widespread sense of solidarity with the rest of the human species.

3.4. The Military Habit

The perspectives and attitudes that prevent the creation of a more desirable security system are learned—they are not innate or determined by human nature. If learned, they can be changed. Yet we, and the institutions we have created, tend to behave as changeless creatures of habit. Faced with new technologies of warfare and more interdependent social relations, old habits that once made sense no longer do so. Historically, civilizations have collapsed when unable to change fast enough to adapt to new conditions. Today old diplomatic habits practiced within the existing international system do not take account of new conditions. As a result, lengthy neogiations fail to halt the arms race, leaving many people of goodwill both frustrated and puzzled by the lack of results.

Yet, the reason for diplomatic failure is quite simple. Diplomats seek to reduce armaments (new behavior required by new technology) while at the same time they want to retain the war system in which governments depend upon arms for power and security (traditional behavior to satisfy old habits and vested interests). Officials cannot abolish weapons at the same time that they rely upon them. In this effort, which cannot succeed, officials seem driven like addicts or alcoholics who try to reduce their procurement of drugs (or arms) while still depending on them for a sense of security and well-being.

To be sure, both the arms advocate and the addict may have understandable reasons to follow their habitual patterns of behavior. Other governments may genuinely threaten one's own,

just as real problems may drive one to rely on drugs to gain momentary relief from anxiety. The use of alcohol is a culturally approved way of relaxing and feeling more secure in situations of stress. Similarly, increasing military power is a culturally approved way of feeling more secure when under international tension. Yet despite the real threats that may push us toward these habits, they easily become self-destructive. This is true even though resort to the habit-forming behavior *at first seemed the only solution.* Arms that once may have solved security problems now threaten our security.

Although dependence on arms is not identical to addiction to a drug, some parallels are instructive. In both cases, elaborate systems of belief are developed to justify behavior even when it has become clearly self-defeating. One's assessment of the intentions of friends and enemies is influenced by the compulsion to satisfy habitually determined "needs." Financial resources are poured into service of the habit, despite other more pressing human needs. A psychological dependency often develops. Many arms advocates show a psychological need for an image of an enemy to justify armaments. Both the arms advocate and the addict pursue a false sense of security, through means that cannot give genuine security.

Like addicts who consider breaking the habit, some advocates of a continuously growing nuclear arsenal feel that their world would fall apart without massive armaments. They insist on keeping the United States number one in destructive capability even though only one-tenth of the present U.S. strategic nuclear force would be far more than is needed to maintain a deterrent capable of destroying any rival power even if the latter attacked first. To be sure, large arsenals provide diplomatic prestige for the United States, but the excess weapons satisfy the demands of the military habit more than the security needs of humanity.

If one genuinely wants to reverse the arms buildup, one must make a commitment to fundamental changes that will enable one to break the military habit completely. This means a decision at the outset to work for abolishing both national military arsenals and the war system which brought them into being. Without that commitment for abolition, selected weapons systems may come and go, as arms control agreements rise and fall, but recurring buildups of arms, like the craving for a fix by an addict, will always return.

An individual's addiction is psychologically difficult to break; a society's defective habit is, in addition, hard to recognize. Some social beliefs—like the idea that there is no feasible alternative to the

present system—are so widely held that few people question them. One person confirms another person's belief, even though their common belief has little basis in reality. For example, for one thousand years after the astronomer Claudius Ptolemy's influential writings, people confirmed one another's belief that the earth was the center of the universe, with the sun revolving around it. Religious and political authorities, supported by a larger population in general, harrassed and even killed heretics who suggested that the earth was not the center of the universe. Such people were considered mad or subversive. For a time, it was conventional wisdom that the earth was flat. Similar beliefs, often supported by religious authorities of the time, for centuries have held women and certain races to be inherently inferior.

These erroneous beliefs are matched today by the socially validated notion that human nature and our honor require us to participate in a war system. Because habit influences thought and behavior, many people erroneously believe that there is no better, feasible security system. As in similar cases in the past, people who now advocate an alternative view of the world and who say that a global society is possible without a war system are usually dismissed as unrealistic.

The following conclusions emerge from the preceding analysis. Although arms control agreements may stabilize certain armaments momentarily, they have not halted the arms buildup any more successfully than a large rock, placed in the middle of a river, halts the flow of the stream. No water moves through the rock, but the river swirls around it on both sides, with the volume undiminished. There are two reasons why arms control agreements fails to stop the arms race in general. First, they do not restrict the overall military programs of governments. Second, arms control policies fail to plan—as realistic policies for major arms reductions must—for substantial changes in people's beliefs and in the structure of the international political system. Nothing less can provide security without national arsenals.

Therefore, the time has come (1) to advocate comprehensive arms reductions rather than to aim only for arms control, and (2) to advocate system change rather than to cling either to the military habit or to the unrealistic hope that disarmament can occur without system transformation.

4.
The Need for a Social Movement

In their speeches, officials sometimes acknowledge that the time is right for behaving as if disarmament were a serious goal. President Carter, for example, speaks of steps toward "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth."[19] Meanwhile, in their actions, officials reject the policies and institutions that could establish a new peace system. Although aware of the dangers of the present policy direction, they cannot bring themselves to break the military habit.

One reason for this gap between word and deed is that, even with good intentions, leaders have difficulty resisting the rewards and punishments offered by the present system. Leaders' actions are guided by a psychological attachment to power, which is reinforced by the benefits of money and influence that accompany large military expenditures. The governmental power to reverse the arms buildup is generally held by those who benefit most from arming. Where power is most concentrated, change is most needed.

That is why change must be initiated by ordinary people, with whom power is now least concentrated. To move toward a more appropriate security system we must first understand that most

19. Text of the President's Inaugural Address, *New York Times*, January 21, 1977.

major governments, if left to their own pursuits, will not lead the way to a better security system. Those who hold the reins of national military power do not want to relinquish them. Those with wealth do not want to share it more equitably. If they did, they could do it quite quickly. The fact that they have not should make us skeptical of mere rhetoric to the contrary.

We should rid ourselves of the comforting but false assumption that when things get bad enough governments will automatically do the right thing. On the contrary, as things get worse, governments often adopt the wrong policies. As resources become more scarce, for example, there will doubtless be a scramble to control the resources, rather than careful, global cooperation to use them as rationally as possible.

Many historical examples demonstrate that leaders in existing systems seldom initiate steps toward new systems. Pharaoh did not liberate the ancient Hebrews. Plantation owners were unlikely advocates for freeing slaves. Male chairmen of committees in the House and Senate and presidents of the boards of large corporations (as well as most other men) did not at first advocate the right of women to participate as equals in society. The countries that benefited from imperialism did not lead the anti-colonial revolution. The oppressive governments of our present world do not support the promotion of human rights. The world's greatest military powers will not be enthusiastic about creating a world in which military power will play no role.

Those people usually called reformers or radicals must at first promote system change. Many politicians are happy to follow the lowest common denominator of opinion, rather than lead in a new direction. That is a useful function during normal times when changes can be made *within* the existing system of institutions. But when changes are required in the basic framework of human relations itself, the politicians' normal posture is an obstacle to progress.

To expect the world's most powerful governments, without outside pressure, to build a new security system where those states now militarily weak would gain influence relative to the states now militarily strong, is like expecting a divine right king to lead the revolution for democracy and for abolition of the throne. We may hope that it will happen, but we would be foolish to wait for it. Yet the necessary changes *can* occur if enough people *insist* that they should.

The single most difficult task in creating a security system ap-

propriate for our time is convincing people to join a movement that aims to abolish war. We are reluctant to try to create such a system because of our belief that it cannot happen. An erroneous but socially validated belief that a certain change is not possible makes it impossible. Take slavery as an example. It has existed in some form or another throughout human history, and during the 1800's in our own society the institution was closely linked to a belief in the racial inferiority of the slaves. Most people thought abolition was unrealistic. But because the opponents of slavery stubbornly insisted on nothing less, it was abolished.

Similar farsighted, but "unrealistic" belief in the possibility of social change has been an essential ingredient in other movements. This was true in the struggle to extend equal rights to women in the face of centuries of inequality and arguments that equality was contrary to human nature and biblical teachings. It was true in the movement to take power away from kings so that all people could exercise influence in governing. For centuries people asked: Who shall be the king? Then, eventually, people began to ask new questions: Should there be a king? Must there be a king? The new questions mark an historical turning point like the one we face today. We once asked: Who shall negotiate for us and be our Commander-in-Chief within a war system made up of uncontrollable, sovereign states? Now, slowly, we are beginning to ask: Should there be a war system? Must there be a war system? The age-old skepticism about system change is being challenged by a new awareness of planetary limits, interdependency, and the need for global policy coordination. The potential for mobilizing a broadly based popular movement is increasing because of the growth of planetary consciousness, instant global communication, and the formation of political coalitions among people impressed with the interlocking relationship between militarism, unemployment, poverty, resource shortages, denial of human rights, and ecological decay.

Throughout the world there are literally millions of people who now hold the values that are necessary for building a global community in which the serving of human needs takes highest priority—not for the benefit of any national group at the expense of the rest, but for the benefit of all people riding on the planet together. There are probably millions more ready to join a movement for change when it looks like it might have a chance of succeeding.

More and more people are aware that rationality is on the side of a secure global community, not national armaments. The question is: who will pioneer the belief that social transformation is

possible? Will it be you and I, or, lacking courage and conviction, will we wait for another generation to take up this challenge, perhaps after entire continents have been despoiled with radioactive fallout or after large segments of humanity have suffered premature death from malnutrition, ignorance, or political repression? Once a sufficient number of people are committed, enough pressure can be brought to bear on governing elites and their supporters to convince them that their political careers will depend on reducing the share of taxpayers' money going into war equipment. Then officials will take seriously the need to build a more just and peaceful world order in which military power will have no role.

People skeptical about fundamental change perhaps will argue that one should never embark on a risky journey without knowing exactly how to reach the desired destination. But on this point, at least, they are wrong. It is not uncommon to reach for a goal without knowing at the outset precisely how to get there. President John Kennedy and supporters of his policies for space research decided, without knowing how it would be done, that a few U.S. citizens should travel to the moon. Despite the uncertainties, with talent, money, and patience it was almost certain that they could get there. Skeptics should recognize that there were more technological unknowns in getting to the moon than there are now in achieving a demilitarized security system. Obstacles to the latter achievement are political and social, of our own making, and subject to human control.

Many skeptics, who refuse to join a movement for change because of uncertainty about how to proceed every step of the way, overlook the uncertainties in their own position. They are themselves embarked on a journey, riding in an overarmed and unstable system, without the slightest idea of how they will safely enter the twenty-first century. It is no fairer to expect the advocate of an appropriate security system to be able to predict exactly the future of human affairs than to expect the advocate of military security to prove that humanity will be secure with nuclear proliferation, the wasting of scarce resources, and continued military rivalry. To be sure, both paths are risky and fraught with danger. Yet, the risks for global community and genuine security are not unattractive when compared to the risks of perpetuating a system based on the threat of mass destruction.

In comparing the two uncertain paths, if we fail to prevent war under either security system, far less of an irrevocable tragedy would probably occur under an improved, non-military security

system than under a military security system. On the other hand, should the positive visions of both systems be capable of fulfillment, the future world under the proposed security system is preferable to that of our prevailing, military security system.

Given our inability to predict the future, it is not possible to provide a specific blueprint for how to achieve an appropriate security system. Nor is it necessary to have a blueprint or to insist upon certainty in planning transition steps before one decides to join a movement to abolish the warfare system. It is, nonetheless, useful to sketch the outline of an appropriate security system. We turn now to that task. There are, of course, many possible approaches, and others should also be examined.[20]

20. See, for example, Charles C. Price and Louis B. Sohn, "A Program for Comprehensive Disarmament," Appendix B, *Report on Evolving International Institutions for Arms Limitation and Disarmament* (Arlington, VA: World Federalists Association, 1977); Alexander Kalyadin and Gerhard Kade (eds.), *Detente and Disarmament: Problems and Perspectives* (Vienna: Gazzetta Publishing House, 1976); UNA-USA National Policy Panel on Conventional Arms Control, *Controlling the Conventional Arms Race* (New York: UNA-USA, 1976); Louis B. Sohn and Betty Goetz Lall, "Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," Twenty-Fourth Report (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, mimeographed, 1976).

5.
A Vision of an Appropriate Security System

It is difficult to envision a world without war, but no more difficult than to imagine a world after war. The expectation of war and the presumed necessity of arms exert a strong hold on our consciousness. Yet if we are to initiate positive social change, it is essential to be bold enough to define the minimum requirements, regardless of how long it takes to meet them, for a security system that functions without war. These essentials are listed below. They may, upon first reading, seem beyond the realm of possibility. But if widespread education and attitudinal change are stimulated by a global social movement, the limits of the possible could widen sufficiently to achieve a new system with the following characteristics:

1. All nations are protected against the threat or use of violence by any other nation.

2. Such protection can be guaranteed in part because the production and the possession of all military weapons are prohibited. (Law-enforcement equipment necessary for the maintenance of domestic tranquility is, of course, not prohibited.) Extremely hazardous non-weapons materials, such as fissionable substances, are also strictly regulated according to universally applied rules.

3. A world security organization functions with the power to enforce the rules against the possession of weapons or the misuse of fissionable materials. It presides over enforcement activities of a transnational police force and administers the arms-reducing

process in its final stages. Officials acting on its behalf have the authority to prevent weapons violations anywhere in the world. The organization, operating within a system of checks and balances to insure accountability, is responsible to a global assembly.

4. A global monitoring agency inspects for violations of weapons prohibitions. Information regarding possible violations can be given directly to the agency by any citizen of any country.

5. Countries are required to settle disputes through nonviolent political, social, or judicial processes.

6. A standing, individually recruited transnational police or peace force enforces the globally established rules for war prevention.

7. The diversion of resources from the manufacture of military equipment into the production of food and the abolition of poverty enables most families on earth to have adequate nourishment and shelter.

Once the movement for an appropriate security system is well advanced, other changes, which are unrealistic by today's standards, would become genuine possibilities:

—Prolonged unemployment could be eliminated by utilizing the potential for global economic cooperation and by diverting investment capital from military production to civilian production that generates more jobs.

—Beaches, streams, lakes, and the atmosphere could recover from an overload of toxic wastes as a portion of funds previously allocated for military expenditures was used for environmental protection.

—Conflicts among nations with different ideologies would continue to be intensely waged, but, as now occurs domestically in some societies, only in nonviolent ways.

—Local and urban governments could experience rejuvenation because the money and talent formerly attracted to weapons production could be applied to development of alternative sources of energy, urban planning, mass transit, adult education, and elimination of unemployment and crime. Also, with the decline of military influence and the elimination of violence in national security policies, national governments would lose the single largest component of their dominance over state and local governments. In the United States there would be less basis for the largess by means of which national institutions exert control over communities and congressional districts across the country. Local governments might receive more citizen attention, resulting in improved quality.

—People could feel less alienated from other nationalities. There would be no need to be ready and willing to destroy generic brothers and sisters in Moscow on fifteen minutes notice. Nor could people need to fear that their wheat or computer components sold abroad will help some "foreigners" gain a military advantage over them. Travel could be less encumbered by political and military chauvinism.

—There would be pervasive internal consequences for some militarized societies. Military dictators and racist regimes would be deprived of one of their major rationales—security needs—as well as of the military hardware they have used to help maintain their power. Starting the process to abolish the warfare system would give new life to the movement for achieving human rights around the world.

—Because military dominance in world affairs could not continue without large national arsenals, forms of non-military influence would take on new importance. Although the industrial giants would continue to possess great power, the presently weak states would no longer suffer the disadvantage of being militarily inferior.

—The advance of human rights and global self-determination would be aided by the demise of covert political interventions by groups like the CIA and KGB. Such activities could no longer be justified on national security grounds, nor would overseas collaborators be so readily found in a climate where military regimes would no longer prosper.

—A decline in the role of military power would also contribute to economic justice. To be sure, the economically powerful societies would not be much more eager to share wealth equitably, but with military power and covert intervention dimished, the rich would be less able to force their will on the poor. Rich elites could no longer rationalize opposition to social reformers on grounds that the latter were a threat to national security. The success of a new ideology in any country could not become a military threat to its neighbors.

Favorable though most of these prospects sound, such a world would be no utopia. There doubtless would be controversies over establishing trade and immigration policies, transferring technology, pricing food and energy resources, and disposing of hazardous wastes. There would be fears that one society might develop powerful non-military means for exerting dominance over other groups. Some disputes will arise that are presently unforeseen. Yet, *all of these conflicts will exist even if we continue the arms buildup*. Resolving them will be far easier if nations are

securely unarmed than if they are armed. The proposed system will establish a better climate for cooperation and make available more resources than a global system heavily burdened by armaments.

A global peace system clearly seems desirable. What strategy could make it possible?

6.
A Strategy for System Change

6.1. Design

A movement for a more appropriate security system can begin among concerned individuals on all continents of the world. The suggestions below apply to U.S. citizens. In other societies complementary actions should be designed to take into consideration local cultural and political conditions. Those leading the effort might be called planetary citizens, defined simply as people who live according to the understanding that politically, ecologically, and morally their well-being and that of their nation are inseparable from the rest of humanity. To assure a system change of global proportions, the movement must be transnational, committed to abolition of the warfare system, and dedicated to firm, nonviolent, citizen action. It would be unwise for such a movement to adopt the idea that a few revolutionaries can or should seize power for themselves in order to usher in a new age. Until there has been widespread attitudinal change, there would be insufficient political support for a humane implementation of the desired changes in institutions, even in the unlikely event that one could capture power.

If concerned individuals and groups make intense efforts to educate and organize for a demilitarized planet, it might be possible within the next twenty-five years to have a process well underway to abolish the war system. Although it is impossible to predict the pace at which changes may occur, for analytical convenience we

can distinguish five different stages, each of five years' duration, for building an appropriate security system:

Phase One: The first five years include vigorous educational and lobbying activities to raise public consciousness and to begin changing government priorities. The balance of political forces in the United States and several other states, where there is already dissatisfaction with wasteful military spending, turns against the perpetuation of the arms buildup.

Phase Two: The United States, the Soviet Union, and many other states commit themselves to annual reductions in military expenditures. These continue throughout the remaining phases. They are coupled to some particular force reductions and a pledge to stop the testing and deployment of all new strategic delivery systems and warheads. A world security organization, whether entirely new or based upon a remodeled United Nations, verifies reductions. National means for verification could also continue.

Phase Three: Both the United States and the Soviet Union move to a minimal nuclear deterrent. Annual budget reductions continue. All middle-range powers are brought within the system of verified, military cutbacks.

Phase Four: Budget cuts proceed at a quickened pace of 20 percent each year. By the end of this stage the nuclear powers dismantle their remaining nuclear weapons. All fissionable materials are regulated by a global authority. Any small states not yet participating are brought into the phased arms reductions.

Phase Five: Conventional arms reductions continue. At the end of this phase military spending and production are permanently prohibited. The global security organization, previously in place, prevents any effort at rearmament.

6.2. Regular Reductions of Military Budgets

This strategy makes budget cuts, coupled with subsequent ceilings for specific weapons systems, the central feature of the disarming process.[21] In the long run, military expenditures provide a

21. Budget cuts have been discussed between the United States and the Soviet Union for at least two decades. The two governments even undertook unilateral, parallel reductions of their budgets and withdrew a small number of troops from Europe in 1963 and 1964. This initial, modest step toward reductions by mutual example was reversed in late 1964 and 1965 when U.S. outlays increased to fight the war in Vietnam. See UNA/USA National Policy Panel on Conventional Arms control (fn. 20), p. 18.

useful general measure of military capability. Budget reductions restrict a total military effort more effectively than agreements on single weapons sytems.

A second merit of this approach is the high degree of flexibility that budget restrictions allow. Participating governments may select the precise mix of forces that they need. Land-locked states, for example, might want to retain far different residual forces during the transition than would sea powers. In short, budgetary reductions provide the most comprehensive yet flexible approach to arms reductions.

Moreover, the budgetary approach is attracti[illegible] because of its simplicity—an essential quality in selecting the most effective strategy for public education, political mobilization, and legislative lobbying. The public may lack time and information to unravel the complexities of whether the United States should have 1320 MIRV's or only 1000, but the public can insist on a 10 percent reduction in expenditures each year.

One problem with this approach is the difficulty of verifying reductions. Obviously, many military expenditures could be made without including the items explicitly in a public budget. As a result, verification of budget cuts will depend upon a global monitoring system that would, through use of satellite surveillance, electronic telecommunication, and other means, make an annual estimate of the expenditures of each nation. Equivalent monetary values would be assigned to comparable components in each state's equipment and military forces, and an overall estimate then made.[22] Because states occasionally would dispute the figures for their own or a rival's expenditures, the agency monitoring expenditures should provide opportunity for presentation of evidence by an interested national government, perhaps from its own intelligence estimates. The final judgment about expenditure levels would have to reside with the global authority, similar to a court of last resort in

22. Private groups already make relatively reliable estimates based on public information. An official transnational group publicly charged with this responsibility could make even more accurate calculations if it could field its own aerial reconnaissance and research teams. Examples of data published annually by independent organizations include Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press); Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures* (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publications); International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS).

domestic legal proceedings. With appropriate efforts and the use of advanced technology for monitoring, the problems of verification could be overcome.

6.3. Phase One: Changing Consciousness

At the outset, persons interested in building planetary community will seek to enlist and energize existing religious and civic organizations for study and political action. Inspired by a heightened sense of human solidarity, people in this modern abolitionist movement will commit themselves to replacing the institutions of war with a new system of peace. They will build a broad coalition to bring the question of major arms reductions to the top of the nation's political agenda. Farsighted and morally sensitive persons now in the ranks of youth groups, environmentalists, feminists, civil rights workers, peace activists, labor leaders, business people, farm workers, churches and synagogues, political parties, and professional organizations will all be involved.

Members will first encourage people to begin thinking about a new image of security. The old idea is that security depends upon military prowess and a government's ability to protect a given piece of *territory*. The new image of security will emphasize the well-being of the world's *people* and the *planet*. Planetary citizens will promote public debate centered on the idea that serving the needs of humanity, not merely of nation or class, should become a principal standard for making decisions. The security of the human race, for example, is related as much to ozone density or to a dependable supply of food and energy as to control over a national segment of territory. Because of the broader, more humane image of security, the movement will seek to implement the following four values as an expression of the global human interest: peace without national military arsenals, economic well-being for all, basic human rights and social justice, and ecological balance.

Territorial discrimination—that is, discrimination against a group of persons because of the territory in which they happen to live—will be recognized as the modern equivalent of age-old racial discrimination. People will understand that letting political boundaries determine who will receive food or petroleum or napalm or fallout is like letting racial lines determine who must sit in the back of the bus.

During Phase One, candidates for public office will be asked to commit themselves to the program of initiatives listed below under Phase Two and published in a globalist platform. If they do

not support these or similar policies, they will be actively opposed by planetary citizens. Legislative initiatives within as many national arenas as possible will be supported to implement the drive for an alternative security system. Within the United States, Congress should be encouraged to halt the deployment of new weapons and to freeze or to begin reducing military expenditures.

In affluent societies, committed individuals will contribute financial resources to consciousness-raising efforts, and, if politically feasible, to an endowment for establishing a standing, transnational enforcement agency. Some persons will refuse military conscription and resist war taxes. In addition, many members will learn the techniques of nonviolent resistance. This capability will help (1) to keep the movement nonviolent even when direct action may be useful, (2) to serve as a check upon the anticipated world security organization to prevent it from performing arbitrary acts, and (3) to increase the capacity to provide security as the disarmament process proceeds.[23]

6.4. *Phase Two: Reducing Military Expenditures and Verifying Reductions*

6.4.1. Budget reductions. As soon as the planetary citizens movement has mobilized sufficient political strength in the United States, the U.S. government will announce its intention to build an alternative security system. Toward that end, it also will commit itself to cut military expenditures annually by 10 percent. It will ask the Soviet Union to reciprocate. Even if the Soviet Union at first does not, the cuts can be safely undertaken and probably should be continued for three successive years.

Why should reductions occur without Soviet reciprocation? First of all, it will take time for a military rival to believe in the seriousness of the announced reductions. Several years may be required for Soviet "doves" to mobilize enough support within the Soviet Union to reverse present Soviet military policies. Three years would allow other countries to take the planetary movement seriously and to lobby the Soviet government to alter its priorities. Time is needed for reluctant governments to witness the economic advantages present in a society no longer burdened by increasing military expenditures.

23. Gene Sharp has described the unrealized political power flowing from nonviolent direct action in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

In addition, several years of an arms reversal program would be required for those governments supporting the new initiatives to establish transnational verification and preliminary enforcement agencies. These agencies' effective operations and their obvious refusal to become instruments of any single nation state would provide some reassurance to governments at first reluctant to join in arms reductions.

Moreover, based on the budget data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,[24] the United States could cut its expenditures by 10 percent for two years without even reducing them to the present level of Soviet spending. If one prefers the estimates by observers who place Soviet expenditures at a somewhat higher level,[25] U.S. reductions could not occur without moving below Soviet military appropriations, but the gap would not be large enough to be destabilizing.

Three years of reductions would not jeopardize U.S. security even within the present international system based on military prowess. The cuts proposed here would enable the United States to retain a nuclear deterrent capable of assured destruction of the Soviet Union until *after* full Soviet participation. Because the present U.S. deterrent force includes substantial overkill, even a 90 percent reduction in deliverable warheads still would leave the United States with more than *twice* the number of strategic weapons necessary to destroy the 240 Soviet cities over 100,000 people.[26] Even if the Soviet Union possessed many more warheads than the United States *and* launched a first strike, it could not prevent the destruction of its own society.

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24. *SIPRI Yearbook, 1977* (fn. 9), p. 223.

25. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-75* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 47, 51; Sivard (fn. 4), p. 21. Sivard comments on different ways of calculating Soviet expenditures, p. 31.

26. This statement is based on the very conservative military assumption that the U.S. should target two warheads for each Soviet city to be destroyed. Some officials claim this is desirable because not all U.S. warheads would survive enroute, due to misfiring of launchers, targeting errors, or Soviet anti-missile missiles. If "only" *one* warhead were targeted for each Soviet city, a 90 percent reduction of the U.S. strategic arsenal would leave the United States with *four times* the number of warheads required for destruction of Soviet metropolitan areas over 100,000 people. These figures *exclude* the approximately 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons now in Europe.

Of course, cutting the budget by a given percentage each year would *not* mean cutting strategic weapons by an identical percentage. The size of weapons reductions would depend upon the particular mix of strategic weapons, tactical weapons, troops, and other conventional forces that the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress might choose.

6.4.2. Arms reductions. Budgetary cutbacks should be accompanied by some explicitly announced reductions of specific weapons. The budget cuts will then carry more precise meaning and communicate clearer intent to reverse the arms buildup. The following procedure probably would be the most efficient means for implementing such reductions. The United States or another country could announce a specific arms reduction at the time it is made. Like the continuing budget cuts, an arms reduction would occur without specific diplomatic negotiations preceding it. *Afterwards,* the precedent-setting state should seek to transform its own initiative into a legal obligation for other states.

For example, the United States might announce that during the third year of budget cuts it would also take out of service all of its land-based ICBM's. After doing this, it could invite other interested parties to conclude a treaty specifying (1) a permanent prohibition against production or possession of ICBM's, (2) the global processes for verifying compliance, and (3) a grievance procedure and adjudicatory organ to which states could take disputes related to the new prohibition.

Such a treaty should be ratified by as many states as possible, even if, as in this instance, many of the signatories might not possess ICBM's. (Signatories should, of course, strengthen the treaty insofar as possible. For instance, they might commit themselves to deny any non-signatories the use of their airports, the right to fly through their airspace, or to send submarines through their territorial waters.) Widespread adherence to the treaty would help establish both the obligatory character of the rules for the signatories and also the eventual applicability of the norms to all states. The more quickly that, say, 130 states ratified such a treaty, the clearer it would be that the norms were approaching "general principles of international law" that apply even to non-signatories.

The global *political* impact of formulating such a treaty is more important, at least in the beginning, than its anticipated *legal* impact. Surely the mere writing of a new treaty by some states would not discourage a determined government from ignoring the

treaty's principles. But more positive results might flow from growing political pressure against a government that deviates from a widely established norm. As the transition toward an appropriate security system gains momentum, any states "holding out" would have to be brought under the prescribed norm. The greater the global consensus, the more likely that sanctions against such a state would be effective.

6.4.3. The politics of reductions. In considering specific arms reductions, there is no magic formula for calculating what should be done first. But, in general, these guidelines apply:

1. Any given reduction by a national government should *precede* the effort to universalize the reduction through conclusion of a formal treaty.

2. Once written, a treaty establishing a new norm for restricting arms should take effect immediately among those nations ratifying it. Norms would then begin to take shape under the influence of the most progressive states, rather than be the product of the lowest common denominator of agreement.

3. Verification of each reduction should be carried out by a global agency, which could include representatives of states not at first agreeing to the reduction.

The first of these guidelines deserves further explanation. Reductions should precede negotiations in order to avoid the following negative consequences that occasionally accompany diplomatic efforts:

—Arms control negotiations focus attention on inequalities in weapons deployed by two sides, so that the inferior side usually steps up its efforts to become equal, while the superior side tries to move further ahead in order to be able to negotiate from a position of strength.

—Weapons that might never have been deployed, or that might not have been deployed so soon, are quickly developed in order to have bargaining chips to "negotiate away" during arms control talks. However, weapons begun as bargaining chips often are later deployed in expanded arsenals. This expansion is then imitated by the rival power.

—The domestic vested interests that favor military expenditures are so powerful that often only cosmetic agreements, formalizing what the governments would have done without any agreement, are possible.

—If an agreement is eventually reached, the Department of De-

fense often can be moved to accept a treaty only by promising it something in return, such as the right to develop a more advanced and more destructive weapon.

—Negotiations sometimes increase international tension and anxiety because critics of a potential agreement are always eager to claim either that the other side will get the best part of the bargain or else that it has cheated on its past promises.

—Ongoing arms control negotiations encourage the informed public to believe, mistakenly, that the government is doing all that can be done to end the arms buildup. If a limited agreement is reached, the public is led to believe that eventually there may be major reductions, although significant reductions of destructive capability in fact have never occurred in the past thirty years. If no agreement is reached, the public is encouraged to believe that the opponent is insincere, aggressive, and troublesome, and that our side should keep up its guard and deploy even more weapons. Arms control negotiations discourage people from looking for more basic flaws in the security system that perpetuates the arms spiral.

Because the arms competition is driven mainly by international political conflicts or by domestic pressures for weapons expenditures, it is not likely that arms can be reduced by focusing mainly on negotiations for arms reductions themselves. Substantial reductions will occur only when a sufficient number of people press their governments for decreased expenditures and transformation of the international system in which military power plays a role in settling disputes. Negotiations will not produce this shift in citizens' attitudes and values.

Until a coalition of planetary citizens and other sympathetic groups has the political strength to get the U.S. government to make reductions *without* prior negotiations with its rivals, the arms buildup will not really be reversed. If officials or the public insist that negotiations precede reductions, pro-military vested interests—in both the United States and the Soviet Union—will have an easy opportunity to stall and suffocate the arms reversal effort.

Time after time, arms control negotiations have provided the basis for pro-military officials to enlist the support of anti-military or neutral forces on the side of new weapons development. Arms *opponents* have voted money *for* research and development of new weapons in order to give bargaining power to U.S. diplomats negotiating for arms reductions. This effect can be avoided only if the public demands reductions first, with negotiations coming later to formalize a precedent rather than to prepare the way to make one.

6.4.4. National initiatives. Although the proposals below will not be adopted until the balance of political forces has tipped against arms proponents, supporters of the new peace system should press for immediate implementation (even in Phase One) of the following steps to supplement budget cuts. These recommendations can be taken by the United States without jeopardizing its security, even if the measures are not at first reciprocated by the Soviet Union.

1. The United States could announce that it would not conduct any further nuclear test explosions. From negotiations already in progress, we know that it would probably be relatively easy to conclude a followup, verifiable agreement on a comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. This would lay the groundwork for bringing pressure to bear on other governments to approve the treaty. The latter might ask the superpowers for reduction of existing nuclear weapons stockpiles in return for making the test ban universal, thus adding to the momentum for arms reductions.

2. The United States could announce that it would not test or deploy any new missiles or warheads, thus halting the most destabilizing part of the qualitative arms competition. This would prevent the deployment of some weapons under development, such as the mobile MX missile, the Mark 12A warhead, and the maneuverable reentry vehicle.

3. The United States could pledge never to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess or allow such weapons in their territory. This measure would remove one incentive that nonnuclear-weapons states now have for acquiring nuclear capability: namely the desire to possess any types of weapons that may be used against them.

4. The United States could pledge never to use nuclear weapons first. Although of limited immediate impact, this action would, in at least a small way, help delegitimize nuclear weapons. It also is the forerunner of a commitment never to use nuclear weapons at all.

6.4.5. Global support for budget reductions. Both domestic and international support for the movement toward an appropriate security system will depend in part upon the benefits derived from budget cuts. Table 3 illustrates the potential savings from regular reductions of the U.S. military budget. For example, if the United States were spending $140 billion by 1982 and then initiated a 10

TABLE 3

Potential Savings From Annual Reductions of Military Budgets (in billions of constant dollars)

Year	Military Expenditures	Annual Savings From 1982 Baseline	Accumulated Savings From 1982 Baseline
1982 Reductions of 10% per year	$140		
1983	126	$ 14	$ 14
1984	113	27	41
1985	102	38	79
1986	92	48	127
1987	83	57	184
1988	74	66	250
1989	67	73	323
1990	60	80	403
1991	54	86	489
1992	49	91	580
1993 Reductions of 20% per year	39	101	681
1994	31	109	790
1995	25	115	905
1996	20	120	1,025
1997	16	124	1,149
1998	13	127	1,276
1999	10	130	1,406
2000	8	132	1,538
2001	7	133	1,671
2002	5*	135	1,806

* *Military pensions and veterans benefits would be placed under the Social Security Administration.*

percent annual reduction, after only three years $79 billion would have been freed for serving human needs. The real savings would be higher than indicated here because, if the proposed plan is not adopted, expenditures would rise above the 1982 baseline.

Although national governments would probably determine how the savings would be spent, the planetary citizens movement should aim at dividing the savings among various groups in order to increase political support for further reductions, to advance justice, and to pay the costs of a new security system. Table 4 suggests a reasonable division of the savings, split evenly between domestic

(#1 and 2) and global (#3, 4, and 5) uses. The rebate to taxpayers and funds for economic conversion would encourage domestic political support, the most crucial ingredient to achieving success. By the fifth year of reductions, for instance, the United States could have, in that one year, $28.5 billion available to relieve personal income taxes and provide a job for everyone. The total for these two purposes during the first five years would be an enormous sum—$92 billion.

TABLE 4

Possible Alternative Uses of U.S. Funds Saved from Budget Reductions

Alternative use of funds	Percentage of savings	Portion of savings from 10 yrs. of reductions (in billions of	Portion of savings from 20 yrs. of reductions constant dollars)
1. Rebate to U.S. taxpayers	35	$203	$632
2. Economic conversion, job retraining, and provision of full employment in U.S.	15	87	271
3. Operating expenses and endowment for a world security organization	15	87	271
4. Global fund for economic development	25	145	452
5. Global fund for environmental protection	10	58	180
	Total	$580	$1,806

Items 3, 4, and 5 in Table 4 would receive financial support from other participating states in addition to the United States. If Soviet contributions were roughly equivalent to those from the United States, the global development fund would receive, during the tenth year alone, a sum of $45.5 billion from the superpowers. A total amount of $290 billion would go into the fund from the Big Two during the first decade. Such a development potential should attract strong support from the less industrialized countries.

The global environmental fund will help win political backing from environmentalists in industrialized states. This fund could

offer financial and technical assistance for curtailing atmospheric and marine pollution that affects many nations. In addition, it could subsidize solar research to expand energy resources without building nuclear power plants.

6.4.6. The role of small and medium powers. The preceding discussion assumes that the planetary citizens movement will be strong enough to insure that the United States would initiate budget reductions. Since the United States is a society with abundant freedom to discuss political issues and to organize pressure groups, as well as the most powerful state in the world, its policies should be a first concern. It seems essential that the United States eventually play a leadership role. But what can be done if the United States or another important actor is reluctant to curtail military outlays?

Smaller powers could take initiatives to encourage a favorable United States response. These actions might be categorized as (1) setting behavioral and normative precedents, (2) building global institutions for an appropriate security system, and (3) limiting war-fighting capability. In the first category, middle-range powers might set an example in microcosm for what the superpowers should do. Sweden, for example, which has a relatively high military expenditure per capita, could initiate an annual budget cut of, say, 5 percent. Then it would encourage other middle-range powers to reciprocate. The budgetary cuts could be matched by specific restrictions on some weapons, reinforced by ratified legal norms.

Second, medium powers could establish a world security organization, perhaps by utilizing remodeled UN machinery, to work out details for standardized budget comparisons. A standing transnational police force, responsible to the world security organization, also would be created during this period.[27] It would build upon the valuable experience of UN peacekeeping forces. Although its functions at first would be too limited to enforce arms reductions, it could help prevent small-scale wars during the transition period, implement humanitarian global norms where feasible, and

27. In *United Nations Forces* (New York: Praeger, 1964), Derek Bowett develops a frame of reference for evaluation of many proposals on this subject. For a recent discussion of the possibilities for establishing a standing, transnational peace force, see Robert C. Johansen and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Global Enforcement of Just Law: A Proposal for a Transnational Police Force," *Forum*, Vol. 8 (October 1976), pp. 117-129.

acquire important experience and legitimacy which would be vital in preventing any attempted violations of required reductions in Phase Five.

Finally, the cooperating countries could undertake common policies that would begin to limit the war-fighting capability of the superpowers. The former states could, for example, prohibit any foreign military personnel or equipment in their territories, in their airspace, or within their territorial waters, unless the foreign state had agreed to globally verified annual budget cuts. Important straits, canals, or waterways where military vessels are now allowed innocent passage through coastal states' territorial waters could be permanently closed to military aircraft, ships, and submarines of non-complying states.

As a further incentive to encourage superpower compliance with phased budget cuts, the military forces of any cooperating state could be allowed port facilities for their submarines, while non-cooperating states would be barred similar rights. In this way the first budget cuts for a complying superpower might be somewhat offset by savings from reduced mileage for aircraft and seagoing vessels allowed free passage and convenient submarine-tending ports by the middle-range powers.

The relationship between the complying superpower and the middle-range powers would not grow into a traditional military alliance with its tendencies to stimulate counter alliances and new military competition. The complying superpower would enjoy the convenience and savings of passage through waterways and access to overseas ports only as long as it *continued* its annual budgetary cuts, verified by the global agency set up by middle-range powers at the outset.

These and other policies by middle-range powers, as well as domestic political pressure, probably would be sufficient to encourage the United States to cooperate once some global verification processes were established.

The remaining question is the one that most troubles U.S. citizens. What can be done if the United States and other sympathetic states carry out budget cuts but the Soviet Union does not reciprocate? In order to avert this possibility, from the very beginning the United States and other supporting governments should attempt to provide economic, trade, and political incentives to the Soviet Union, as well as to China, France, and other major powers, to cooperate.

A firm United States commitment to create a peace system

would have a profound impact upon Soviet leaders. Their decision whether or not to initiate reductions will depend upon their assessment of how to maximize Soviet interests. This assessment in turn will depend heavily upon their perception of U.S. intentions. In both regards, budget reductions initiated by the United States should encourage Soviet compliance. Lower U.S. budgets in the future can clarify peaceful U.S. intentions much better than have limited arms control measures with generally rising budgets in the past. Being able to lower Soviet military budgets would also enable the Kremlin to proceed more effectively with Soviet economic development.

U.S. and Soviet leaders could undertake the first budget reductions even in the presence of their genuine ideological differences. Indeed, progress in reducing arms will make the ideological cleavages less deep and tension-producing. In order to establish an appropriate security system, these conflicts need to be softened somewhat, but not eliminated altogether. Ideological rivals do not need to trust one another, although they must eventually believe that their security interests will be protected through a combination of (1) arms reductions reciprocated by their opponents and (2) fair treatment by the global agencies responsible for verifying reductions and enforcing the prohibitions against rearmament.

As this occurs, the same competition that now propels the arms buildup could eventually encourage reciprocation of budgetary cuts. The failure of one superpower to divert spending from needless overkill weapons to humane growth could lead to competitive disadvantages for the arming country. In addition to having a less healthy domestic economy, diplomatic disadvantages could result from the inability to offer substantial development assistance overseas. The chronic Soviet anxieties about Chinese military intentions and the need for European allies would also be eased by dismantling the war system.

Moreover, it would be in the interest of both superpowers to establish a global security system, with some potential for peaceful dispute settlement, rather than to face a militarized future in which destabilizing weapons are bound to spread around the globe and erode the superpowers' influence. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are *status quo* powers in the sense that they would be relatively happy if there were no major, global shifts of wealth and power. Gradual adjustments of these in the future would be easier to make if the world were using legal and nonviolent means of conflict resolution rather than violent means, unrestricted by uni-

versally enforced rules. Recognition of this long-range self-interest may be a compelling factor in achieving Soviet cooperation.

When it becomes clear to the Soviet leadership that it is not militarily threatened by the intentions or capabilities of any other state, and that it is economically or diplomatically harmful for Soviet society to continue weapons procurement, it is reasonable to expect Soviet leadership to join the process.[28]

Still, it is possible that the Kremlin leadership might refuse to cooperate. It could be dominated by officials eager to satisfy imperial ambitions. Although reason might point toward budget reductions, Soviet leaders might cling to unreasonable policies. Under such circumstances, no policy, regardless of the size of the U.S. military budget, could escape grave risks. As is well-known, deterrence is based on the assumption that one's opponents will be rational enough to avoid behavior that will bring destruction of their own society. If the leaders were sensitive to avoiding destruction in the long run, they would probably reciprocate with budget reductions. If they were not that sensitive, long-range security for the United States can hardly be assured even with a competitive arms buildup.

Given the prospect of unreasonable leadership by a major power, humanity would then (as now) face the question: will the human race be more secure by pursuing the arms competition or by taking initiatives toward an appropriate security system? The imponderables of that question dwarf even the boldest speculations about the possible outcomes for civilization from traveling one road or the other. Yet, irrational behavior is more likely to be corrected by creating a non-threatening political environment than by making nuclear threats against the people behaving irrationally. Peaceful policies are reassuring and conducive to more rational action.

The point here is not to belittle the tragic consequences of a superpower's chronic refusal to proceed toward an appropriate security system. Nor is it to overlook human greed and the arrogance of power. The point is simply that, even if a superpower refused to move toward an appropriate security system, the human race would not be more secure by reverting to a new arms race than it would be if it were to search for a new strategy aimed at eventually abolishing the warfare system. This search might not produce results until a change of political leadership occurred, but for sever-

28. Absolutely unreasonable Soviet policies are much less likely now than in Stalin's day, because policies are the result of collective decisions rather than of one person's dictation.

al years it would not jeopardize any state's security nor exacerbate the arms buildup.

Phase Two would not end nor Phase Three begin until both the United States and Soviet Union were participating in regular budget cutbacks.

6.5. *Phase Three: Adopting a Minimal Deterrent, and Broadening Participation*

Phase Three could begin with the United States adopting a minimum deterrent posture, defined as the smallest number of strategic nuclear weapons required to inflict unacceptable damage upon potential opponents. Because the basis for deterrence would remain, both superpowers could move to a minimum deterrent without being forced to make rapid, fundamental shifts in their strategic doctrines.

Middle-range powers would be encouraged to join the process of annual budget reductions as soon as possible. Many states would favor making budget reductions universal soon after the superpowers' cuts were underway. Japan, which has made relatively few such expenditures since World War II, would probably support the idea. U.S. allies like the United Kingdom would probably also agree. Soviet allies would follow Moscow's lead. Many other states, such as the Netherlands, Canada, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and some Scandinavian countries have traditionally supported arms reductions. Budget cuts might be combined with gradually expanding demilitarized zones throughout the territories of medium powers.

Toward the end of Phase Three, expenditures of the United States and the Soviet Union would have decreased to a point where they were approaching equivalency with the outlays of the middle-range powers like China, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Iran. As soon as the expenditures of any non-complying state equaled the diminishing budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union, the non-participating country would be *required* to reduce military outlays at the community-established pace. A combination of economic incentives and diplomatic pressure probably would induce other states to comply with phased reductions. If they did not, they would face economic and diplomatic sanctions. Since the governments implementing the cuts would want to enforce the budgetary reductions on others, there would be a reasonable prospect that such sanctions would be imposed.

TABLE 5

Steps Toward an Appropriate Security System

Phase One

- Educate the public about the insecurity inherent in the arms buildup, the limits of arms control, and the need for global system change.
- Exert pressure for a freeze on new weapons and military spending.

Phase Two

- Press for national initiatives to reduce U.S. and U.S.S.R. military expenditures by 10 percent each year.
- Reinforce budget cuts with specific force reductions.
- Prohibit testing and deployment of all new strategic systems.
- Establish a world security organization.
- Channel savings from military expenditures into service of human needs.

Phase Three

- Reduce nuclear weapons to the lowest level possible while maintaining a minimal nuclear deterrent.
- Continue budget reductions at 10 percent each year.
- Reinforce budget cuts with specific force reductions and demilitarized zones.
- Bring middle-range powers into participation.

Phase Four

- Reduce budgets by 20 percent each year.
- Reinforce budget reductions with specific force reductions and expanded demilitarized zones.
- Bring all remaining states into the annual budget reductions.
- Establish control by a global public authority over all fissionable materials.
- Dismantle nuclear weapons.

Phase Five

- Authorize the global security organization to prevent rearmament.
- Continue budget reductions until military expenditures are permanently prohibited at the end of Phase Five.
- Reduce conventional arms until the end of Phase Five when the production and possession of military equipment are prohibited.

6.6. Phase Four: Accelerating Reductions

The goals of the fourth stage will be (1) to increase the pace of budget reductions to 20 percent each year, (2) to insure that all reductions are verified with increasing precision, (3) to strengthen the previously established global agency for enforcing reductions so that no complying state may reverse its direction and rearm, (4) to dismantle all remaining nuclear weapons, (5) to bring all non-complying states into the process and to arrange equitable political representation of all societies in global organizations for peaceful settlement, and (6) to prevent wars during the critical stage of transition to a new security system. Let us examine each of these briefly.

Once all the major powers have joined the process of phased budget reductions, the pace should proceed as quickly as it is possible to make internal economic adjustments to lower military expenditures. During the dismantling of national arsenals verification of each year's reductions will be very important. Fortunately, Phases Two and Three would have provided opportunities to reduce suspiciousness and to develop effective means for inspection well before it would be necessary to be precise in assuring that one state did not gain a slight edge over another state's coercive capacity.

During Phase Four the world security organization, supported by the major attitudinal and political changes of previous phases, would acquire the authority to prevent individual officials, scientists, or industrial managers from rearming or evading the guidelines set for budgetary and force reductions. If, for example, a state cut its budget by only 5 percent rather than the agreed upon 20 percent, the world security organization would initiate enforcement action through court proceedings established to handle such disputes. If the court decided the state was delinquent, global marshals might enter the country to close a factory or weapons research center in order to bring the country within the prescribed guidelines. If the government of the offending state interferred with such enforcement, the country would be subjected to economic and political sanctions. In addition, the world security organization would use the transnational peace force to patrol the country's borders, to enforce a total embargo, and perhaps to take other measures to prevent national rearmament. Planetary citizens groups might also encourage labor strikes and civil disobedience by citizens who lived within the offending state. These acts could be aimed both at stopping war production and promoting political change within the country.

Nuclear weapons remaining in national arsenals should be dismantled during this time, and all fissionable materials should be controlled by a global agency to prevent any possible misuse or theft. Taking this step would be politically feasible because for approximately the ten preceding years the superpowers will have conducted no weapons tests, deployed no new weapons, reduced their military budgets, and adjusted to a minimal deterrent. Indeed, by this time a nuclear deterrent may begin to appear superfluous. Conventional arms will remain in Phase Four, although in reduced numbers due to the continually dwindling military budgets, in order to permit a gradual transition away from the war system.

With good reason, smaller states might fear that their interests would be jeopardized by great power collaboration during the transition to a new system, much as they have been in the past. To avoid this result, a vigorous effort would need to be made to insure that plans for phased reductions were a product of equitable participation by all societies of the world.

As the military instrument declined in importance for resolving conflict in world society, there would be a corresponding increase in the need to have dependable means for achieving peaceful change. Organizational structures for this have been discussed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.[29] At the least, such structures must provide for equitable, global representation that gives heavy weight to the world's distribution of population and productivity. Surely the organization should not limit representation exclusively to national governments. Transnational economic organizations, professional and labor groups, and some representatives chosen directly by the people should all be included. Where peaceful settlement can be handled by regional rather than global institutions, the former will be encouraged to manage the conflicts.

To avoid jeopardizing the progress of the movement to a new system, the prevention of war during the fourth phase will be ex-

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29. See, for example, Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1976), especially Chapters 4 and 5; Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black (eds.), *The Future of the International Legal Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), Vols. 1 and 4 (especially Donald W. McNemar, "The Future Role of International Institutions," pp. 448-79); Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *The Strategy of World Order; The United Nations*, Vol. 3 (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), Chapters 8 and 9; Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *Introduction to World Peace Through World Law* (Chicago: World Without War Publications, 1973).

tremely important. For the following reasons, the world security organization should be successful in peacekeeping:

—Most rival states would be reducing their arms at roughly equivalent levels, thus making it unlikely that one state could hope for sufficiently superior forces to yield certain victory. Without that assurance governments would be unlikely to initiate wars.

—Surprise attacks would be less likely because global monitors would report not only military expenditures but also deployment and location of forces.

—The transnational police force would be available at all times to patrol borders and maintain buffer zones in trouble spots.

—With limits on expenditures and various kinds of equipment, intense arms races would be unlikely.

—Improved, transnational political organs for facilitating peaceful change would offer more dependable, nonviolent means for grievance settlement.

—Some border disputes and political conflicts would diminish in intensity and importance as the expectation of war declined. For example, Israel presumably would be less fearful about who occupied the Golan Heights if the capacity to wage war was being abolished. There would be no need to fight a war *now* in order to be in a strong position to defend oneself in a future war.

6.7. Phase Five: Prohibiting National Military Arsenals

Budget cuts will continue at a minimum of 20 percent per year until the end of Phase Five when military expenditures and residual national forces would be completely abolished. A permanent prohibition on military spending and the production or possession of military weapons would come into force. (Equipment required for law enforcement by authorized local, national, and global officials would remain legal.)

Once weapons are prohibited, of course, war prevention would be much easier because no state would possess the capability to engage in war. Any effort to rearm would be stopped immediately by the world security organization and its enforcement officers. Disputes would be settled through either bilateral negotiations or regional and global organizations for peaceful settlement.

7.
Arguments Against Joining the Movement for an Appropriate Security System

There are at least four important reasons why U.S. citizens are reluctant to press Washington officials to begin regular arms reduction. First, some critics argue that the above plan comes too close to being unilateral disarmament. They fear that the Soviet Union will cheat and attempt to take over U.S. society. Second, many people believe that, even if the idea of abolishing the war system is a good one, the plan is just too idealistic about human nature and about our capacity to implement it. Third, working class people are concerned about losing their jobs and income if cuts are made in military expenditures. Finally, many people intuitively fear that, even if the plan makes sense and can be implemented, the new global system is likely to give us a worse life than we now have. Let us examine each of these reasons for caution.

7.1. Will the Proposed Plan Lead to Unilateral Disarmament?

When critics charge that the above plan sounds like unilateral disarmament, they are fearful that the proposed initiatives will leave the United States defenseless and insecure. That fear is without foundation because of the presence of a minimal nuclear deterrent and conventional forces until after the Soviet Union fully par-

ticipates and an effective world security organization is functioning. The fact that the United States is called upon to initiate action is not undesirable in itself. The same people who oppose initiatives for a new security system often favor U.S. initiatives in acquiring more advanced weapons before any other state develops them. To be the first to deploy such weapons is a unilateral initiative to achieve more security through arms. The proposed plan follows a parallel approach in urging the United States to take first-step initiatives to achieve greater security, but through means more dependable than arms.

It is now clear that an open-ended buildup of weapons of mass destruction leads humanity toward greater and greater insecurity. Therefore, those who favor deploying more advanced U.S. armaments are in reality the advocates of unilateral steps toward an insecure and defenseless United States (and world). Arms proponents mistakenly assume that to stay ahead in armaments is to move ahead in security. In fact, to move ahead in security means to aim at abolishing arms and the war system.

In short, the Soviet Union is unlikely to cheat or to be able to conquer the United States because (1) during a fifteen year period of arms reduction the United States would retain sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to maintain a deterrence posture; (2) more long-term Soviet (and U.S.) economic and political interests would be served by obeying the agreements than by violating them; (3) global monitors and national technical means for surveillance would quickly discover any significant violations; (4) the Soviet Union would face serious diplomatic setbacks if it attempted to cheat, thereby damaging its own effectiveness in world affairs; (5) once national arsenals have been abolished, global enforcement agencies and continued awareness of incentives for compliance will prevent rearmament.

7.2. Is the Proposed Plan Too Idealistic About Human Nature?

The proposed plan is more firmly rooted in an empirical and rational assessment of future security problems and prospects than are present U.S. national security policies. To be specific, (1) unlike existing policy, the above plan offers a reasonable way to end the growth and spread of weapons of mass destruction; (2) the proposed plan requires *no* technology that is not presently in hand,

whereas the present policy requires a steady effort, with uncertain results, to achieve technological breakthroughs always before a rival does, and then to prevent them from being used on ourselves by terrorists or other opponents; (3) major attitudinal change of many people *is* possible in a short time if people see the need for change and feel that any sacrifices demanded of them are shared fairly among the population; and (4) *if* people are unified, they *can* press their own governments, even though the latter are run by privileged elites, to alter their policies. Citizens have far more power than they normally use or understand they possess.

7.3. Will Cuts in Military Spending Cause Unemployment?

Recent employment experience as well as studies by government and private agencies demonstrate that cuts in military expenditures do not need to increase overall unemployment. Indeed, with proper planning a decrease in military spending would *increase* the number of jobs available. For example, $1 billion spent to build long-range bombers creates employment for 22,000 workers. An identical amount of money spent for law enforcement or medical services would employ 73,000 policemen or 85,000 nurses, providing roughly three and a half times as many jobs. When the number of jobs created by all forms of military expenditures are compared to the number of jobs generated by equivalent spending by public and private agencies in the non-military sector, we find that *the current U.S. military budget of $107 billion deprives U.S. citizens of 1,240,000 jobs.*[30] By using the savings from reduced military spending, private investors and government programs could assure job retraining and new employment for every person temporarily unemployed by the phasing out of military contracts. Once workers are engaged in the production of non-military goods, their jobs and incomes will be more secure than if they had remained in war production. A decrease in military spending would also dampen present trends towards rising prices.

30. See the press release from Senator Edward Kennedy, "Senator Edward M. Kennedy Releases Study Showing That Military Spending Hurts Employment," February 13, 1977 (mimeographed), p. 1; and Marion Anderson, *The Empty Pork Barrel: Unemployment and the Pentagon Budget* (Lansing, Mich.: Public Interest Research Group, 1978).

7.4. *Will a New Security System Lead to an Undesirable Global Government?*

There are plausible reasons for fearing harsh, unjust, or unprosperous conditions in a new security system characterized by more global policy coordination. Yet these reasons will be no more troublesome in the proposed system than in the existing system. To have good governance at any level and in any kind of security system, citizens must insist on participating in the major decisions of their communities. Citizens need to act as watchdogs, to inquire about what officials are doing, to discourage corruption, and to press officials to serve the needs of all persons rather than the vested interests of a few.

It is to be expected that many of the potential evils that accompany government on the national level will also be present on the global level. Except for the problem of global as opposed to national scale, the new system should produce no greater fears about government than the present system.

The apprehensiveness about the larger scale of institutions for policy coordination at the global level, while serious, turns out *not* to be well-founded. When the war system is abolished, the institutions of the new peace system will *not* need to be more powerful than the existing national governments of the major military powers. The latter have accumulated great power in part for military reasons. When national military institutions are phased out, the remaining national and the new global institutions could each possess *less* concentrated power than the governments of today's two superpowers. In addition, new life and strength can be infused into the decision-making bodies of local communities. Therefore, if the movement toward an appropriate security system is successful, there will be less worrisome consequences flowing from excessive centralization of governmental power than now exist in the large U.S. and Soviet governments which are heavily influenced by military interests. The attractiveness of the proposed security system is even greater when it is compared to the kind of governance that is likely to develop if the arms buildup continues.

Moreover, certain problems that exist in the present system will be resolved in an appropriate security system. The distorting force of military officials and their corporate suppliers in the market place and in governmental decisions would be removed. Social critics would not need to be feared (or silenced) on national security

grounds. Free speech might even spread to new corners of the world. The loss of privacy through government surveillance, the coverup of misdeeds by officials on grounds of protecting national security, and the censorship of the press for security reasons could no longer be justified. Military conscription would disappear.

When all these matters are carefully weighed, rather than left unconsidered because of emotional or selfish attachments to military power, it seems clear that those people who genuinely fear big government and who oppose the impersonal character of big bureaucracies should be among the most enthusiastic supporters of the movement for abolishing the war system. On balance, the proposed security system offers more hope for maintenance of democratic, humanitarian values than does an indefinite continuation of our present course.

8.
The Challenge

The preceding pages have shown that:

—the continued expansion of military arsenals, coupled with their obvious inability to serve human and environmental needs, make us less secure with each passing month;

—present governmental approaches to control armaments have failed—not because of any official's bad intentions but because current policies do not aim at replacing the war system with a peace system;

—the advocates of keeping the United States militarily number one in the arms buildup are in reality advocates of unilateral initiatives that will, in the long run, leave the people of the United States and world insecure and susceptible to nuclear destruction;

—a more secure, less violent global system can be created;

—this preferred system can provide not only peace but far greater social justice, economic well-being, and ecological security than the present, highly militarized international system;

—the most important *missing* ingredient for creating an appropriate security system is the willingness of ordinary people to work with determination and tireless dedication to abolish war and to build a better system.

That system can be built if enough people believe in its feasibility and act for its realization. Many persons are inactive because they genuinely doubt that major arms reductions are possible. These people need to consider what they can do to weaken the link between arms and security and to forge a new link between disarmament and security. Other people, pursuing an illusory security through military power or their own financial gain from large military expenditures, will vigorously oppose the policy recommendations, if not the positive vision, offered here. They are entitled to their view, but they are not entitled to an undisputed right to lay waste this planet and its people. Their view and their vested interests must be challenged.

They *will* be challenged, by planetary citizens acting with reasoned determination. There will be a movement, transcending race, nation, class, and sex, working to create a peace system designed to serve human needs first. Just as legalized slavery among people gave birth to the abolitionist movement against the slave system, so legalized violence among nationalities will produce new abolitionists against the war system. It is now unclear whether the anti-abolitionists, advocating more arms, or the abolitionists, favoring global community, will gain the most adherents. For those who share the positive vision of a world without war, of a world with local communities of people seeking lives of dignity, participation, mutual cooperation, and genuine freedom, now is the time to join the effort for a new peace system.

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